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Environmental Challenge and Animal Agency
Marek Špinka and Françoise Wemelsfelder

ABSTRACT
Challenges are there to be overcome – seen usually as problems to avoid rather than as opportunities to
enjoy. However, for humans a life without challenge would be likely to be dull and boring, lacking the
enthusiasm and satisfaction that come with individual development. Could this also be true for animals?
This chapter looks at the positive value of engaging with environmental challenges for animal welfare,
proposing that this value lies in an animal’s expression of agency and the enhanced functional
competence that it gains through this. It explores the different facets of agency, and provides more
detailed discussion of key elements such as problem solving, exploration and play, as well as discussing
responses to challenge and how an animal’s welfare affected if it is prevented from performing
behaviours of this kind. The final sections of the chapter consider how monotonous, predictable, captive
environments may lead to apathy and boredom, and prevent animals from experiencing a positive quality
of life. Agency should be regarded as an integrative capacity that works across specific modules of
organization and, as such, forms an important condition for an animal’s overall well-being and health.

1. Introduction
Animals in the wild face many challenges. Predators, food shortage, social competition and intricacies,
weather, illness – all these threaten their health and survival and hamper their reproductive efforts. For
any species and any individual, the natural environment is complex and in an ever-fluid state as a result
of fluctuating physical conditions and the actions of cohabiting living beings. Animals are adept at turning
challenges into opportunities, sometimes through mastery in a specific task, sometimes through flexibility
of response, yet such capabilities are often not enough to stay fit, survive and reproduce. Challenges are
intrinsic and natural yet, if they are too severe or too many, animals fail to cope with them and their
individual welfare deteriorates, frequently to the point of premature death.
By contrast, animals in captivity often live in simple, monotonous and predictable environments, where
they are challenged infrequently or not at all. One might expect this to be an improvement: the animal can
relax and get on with its life. But could it go too far the other way – might animals also suffer from a lack
of environmental challenge? How much of a welfare problem is the fact that captive animals live in barren
environments that give them very little opportunity to engage actively with meeting the needs of their own
life?
Before turning to this question, it is necessary to look at how wild-living animals deal with challenges.
Some challenges come with little novelty but still demand a lot of attention, time or energy because they
pose an important threat or opportunity. For instance, coping with seasonal temperature stress or
defending a position in a stable dominance hierarchy are serious challenges, but the aspect of novelty
may not play an important role in them. Animals can overcome these challenges by being masters in
specific behavioural or physiological tasks and responses. Other challenges are highly unpredictable,
such as predator attacks, sudden turmoils in social situations or random changes in food accessibility.

Such challenges are much more likely to present animals with novel problems, for which they must be
able to find new solutions. While challenges of the first type (such as social stress, hunger, illness) are
dealt with in other chapters, in this chapter we focus on challenges induced by novelty. Our discussion of
an animal’s ability to deal with such challenges will centre around two key concepts, competence and
agency (White, 1959). We see these terms as reflecting complementary aspects of the animal’s
engagement with novel challenges, and in this chapter we will explore the evidence and interpretations
that support their relevance to the study of animal welfare.
We use the term competence to denote the whole array of cognitive and behavioural experience, tools
and strategies that an animal possesses at any given moment to deal with novel challenges. How do
animals acquire and enhance such competence? As for any biological trait, animals inherit genetic
predispositions that feed into and support the different aspects of competence. These predispositions
unfold through developmental maturation and sensory experience (Rogers, 2008), and by learning
through interaction with the hard-and-real everyday striving for food, security, partners, social ties etc.
However, if competence could be stepped up only as a result of reaction to external events, the process
would be haphazard and risky. It may be too late to start looking for a solution when the challenge is
already arriving. Therefore, it is also worth it for the animal to invest in the future, i.e. to expend time and
energy in exposing itself to a degree of risk in order to have better chances at dealing with unexpected
events later on. Many animals hoard food or build body reserves for lean times – but they also gather
information and/or train their own abilities for later times and moments of need.
In this chapter, we label as agency the propensity of an animal to engage actively with the environment
with the main purpose of gathering knowledge and enhancing its skills for future use. In other words,
agency is the intrinsic tendency of animals to behave actively beyond the degree dictated by momentary
needs, and to widen their range of competencies. In goal-oriented behavioural sequences such as
foraging, mate seeking and predator avoidance, the animal will mostly use existing skills, whereas
through agency-based patterns such as exploration and play, it is building novel competencies. In reality,
however, these two aspects of a day’s ongoing problem-solving activities are often intertwined, because
features of the environment are rarely sharply divided into ‘old’ and ‘new’ challenges, and the animal’s
response will often be a mixture of reactive and proactive decision making. One could say that agency
and competence reflect, respectively, the procedural (more proactive) and functional (more reactive)
aspects of the animal’s ability to prepare for, discern and resolve challenges that are meaningful to it in
the context of its ecological niche (White, 1959).
2. Facets of Agency/Competence
What then should we think of as the main features of animal agency/competence? In this section, we list
several major aspects of environmental challenge and link these aspects with complementary facets of
animal agency/competence.
First, the environment is rich and complex. Most animal species live in complex ecosystems that offer a
plethora of stimuli and their inter-contingencies. Only few of the apparent associations between
environmental features reflect true causal links, and even fewer can be harnessed, but the utility of those
few can be pivotal. For instance, food can often be discerned only through very subtle or highly complex
cues. Therefore, animals need a highly developed ability of associative learning.
Secondly, elements of the natural environment, especially other organisms, often resist attempts to
harness them. For example, plants and animals defend themselves from being eaten through structural
and/or behavioural defences, such as hard shells, or poisonous skins or stings. Thus, animals need to

learn how to overcome such hindrances effectively, and to develop good operant or instrumental learning
capability.
Thirdly, the environment continually presents the animal with new objects, situations and events. It is
important to learn more about the nature of these as soon as possible, and it is safer to do this when
other challenges are not looming; therefore animals tend to react to novel objects with inspective
exploration.
Fourthly, most wild animals live in an open world. That is, they live in an environment where there is a
possibility to expand their horizon of knowledge and activity – a valuable resource could be hidden just
behind the next bush or stone. Therefore, in addition to inspective exploration, inquisitive exploration is a
fundamental element of the animal’s competence.
Fifthly, from the animal’s perspective, the environment is highly probabilistic. That is, because of the
intrinsic variability of so many features of the environment, the same action by the animal works on some
occasions but not on others. This probability may change in time and it may also contain a hidden
regularity or combination of contingencies that the animal might be able to detect through more intense
engagement. In order to allocate its time, energy and attention efficiently, the animal should be motivated
to track the environment’s stochasticity, i.e. it would have to be able to assess uncertainty and update this
information regularly.
Sixthly, many sources of environmental variability, especially those generated by other animals, interfere
with the animal’s activities and this often leads to lack or loss of control over its own movements and
actions. Therefore, animals possess not only species- and situation-specific skills but also a general
behavioural, cognitive and emotional flexibility. One prominent way to train for the unexpected is through
play.
Lastly, but not least, others living in the natural environment are also knowledgeable. Conspecifics and
other organisms also gather and appraise information about the environment, and it is often faster, more
precise and/or more efficient to use, share and combine this available knowledge than to rely solely on
one’s own experience and assessment. Therefore, animals are adept at observational and social
learning, and at communicating with others around them in general.
The list of challenge types in this section does not aspire to be comprehensive but it shows that in order
to live and reproduce in the natural world, animals need a large array of behavioural and cognitive
activities, such as associative, operational/instrumental and social learning, information gathering and
updating, flexibility in the face of atypical events and/or loss of control and, generally, a sophisticated
capacity for communication. These facets continuously interact with and enhance each other; for
instance, regular patrolling in order to update information can reveal novel features in the environment
that stimulate exploration, which, in turn, may produce incentives to employ operational learning, e.g. on a
potential food source. The concepts of agency and competence can thus best be regarded as denoting
the animal’s ability to integrate these various facets into effective, intelligent conduct that will optimize its
survival and wellbeing. Such a view sits well with the growing tendency among scientists no longer to
regard ‘intelligence’ as the prerogative of a select few so-called ‘higher’ animal species, but rather as a
systemic characteristic of adaptively behaving organisms (e.g. Manrod et al., 2008; Matzel and Kolata,
2010).
3. The Expression of Agency/Competence in Problem Solving, Exploration and Play
In this section, we focus on problem solving, exploration and play as examples of prominent facets of
agency/competence. These three facets illustrate well how agency and compentence are intertwined,

although functional competence-oriented aspects are more pronounced in problem solving, while
procedural agency-based aspects prevail in play.
Problem solving
Problem solving comes into action when previously applied behavioural solutions no longer work to attain
a goal such as obtaining food. The animal then switches back to appetitive behaviours and modifies
them, but also engages ‘off-line’ higher levels of cognitive control where representations of the world
beyond the current sensory input as well as memories of the animal’s own past actions, successes and
failures are stored (Toates, 2004). So problem solving is initially driven by an external situation, but it
triggers cognitive processes that have many degrees of freedom and that may well continue beyond the
instant when the animal solves the actual problem.
Harlow (1950) was one of the first to demonstrate that problem solving itself is intrinsically rewarding to
animals when he showed that rhesus monkeys will manipulate and learn to open a complex six-step
mechanical puzzle even when no explicit reward is given for either manipulating or solving the puzzle.
Recent evidence for an intrinsic motivation for problem solving came from Langbein et al. (2009), who
taught dwarf goats to discriminate between sets of visual shapes with water as a reward. When the goats
were later presented both with freely available water and water attained through the cognitive task, the
goats still oriented about one-third of their drinking activity towards the cognitive task. Such data illustrate
that problem solving encompasses an element of active cognitive engagement that goes beyond the
immediate problem at hand, and that animals continue to exercise even when the problem no longer
exists.
This propensity appears to have longer term beneficial consequences for the animal’s ability to cope with
its environment. For instance, Bell et al. (2009) rearranged the spatial configuration of the living
environment for laboratory rats frequently for several weeks and made it more complex every 10 days.
Rats living in this dynamic, enriched and cognitively demanding space were subsequently shown to be
faster learners in spatial memory and danger avoidance tasks than control rats. Another example is a
study by Ernst et al. (2005), who provided individual pigs with an automated feeding system that
summoned them to the feeding station by individually distinct acoustic stimuli. Pigs cognitively challenged
in this way showed fewer aberrant behaviours in the home pen and less fear in a novel environment than
conventionally fed pigs, indicating an improvement of their coping abilities (Puppe et al., 2007).
Exploration
Exploration is a form of behaviour that appears to be directly aimed at gathering information (Archer and
Birke, 1983; Wemelsfelder and Birke, 1997). If, for example, we observe a laboratory rat placed into an
unfamiliar arena, or cattle entering a new pasture, what we are likely to see is the animals moving around
inspecting all kinds of stimuli in their new surroundings. However, animals not only explore in response to
new situations, but also go out and actively seek novel stimuli, which is often referred to as ‘inquisitive
exploration’. For instance, piglets prefer to visit places where they can expect novel objects to places
where they will encounter familiar objects (Wood-Gush and Vestergaard, 1991). Thus, exploration has its
own motivation that is expressed, for instance, in the strong rebound of explorative activity that can be
observed when animals housed in impoverished conditions are presented with a novel object or situation
(Stolba and Wood-Gush, 1981; Wood-Gush and Vestergaard, 1993).
The motivation for exploration (labelled ‘curiosity drive’ by Berlyne, 1960) probably evolved because
animals need to reduce the environmental uncertainties that they are constantly faced with in the wild
(Inglis, 1983, 2000; Dall et al., 2005). Recent research has identified the neural mechanisms that underlie

the motivation for exploration. For instance, Cohen et al. (2007) argue that the trade-off between the
exploitation of known resources and the exploration of new alternatives is governed by a complex
interplay of brain systems in which the forebrain cholinergic and adrenergic systems monitor the expected
and unexpected forms of environmental uncertainty, medial frontal brain structures report about rewards
and costs, and the locus coeruleus noradrenergic system integrates these inputs and shifts the behaviour
either towards exploitation or exploration. Intensive research is also being pursued on many other
aspects of exploration such as evolutionary modelling (Dall et al., 2005), or the social dimension of
information gathering. Seppanen et al. (2007) for example, review evidence that animals explore the
environment not only directly but also indirectly, through paying specific attention to cues and signals from
both conspecific and heterospecific animals. The common theme of all such research is that active
gathering of information brings animals crucial advantages for the future, and they are therefore well
equipped and strongly motivated to engage in it.
Play
One of the defining features of play behaviour is that it is a spontaneous, intrinsically motivated activity
that is being performed for its own sake rather than to achieve a consummatory goal such as to obtain
food, escape a predator or gather information (Burghardt, 2005). It has, therefore, always been assumed
that play has deferred, long-lasting positive effects on the development of young animals. More recently,
it has been documented that play can also have immediate functions. For instance, domestic dogs seem
to confirm their dominance relationships during play (Bauer and Smuts, 2007), and post-pubescent
laboratory rats use social play initiation to maintain friendly relationships with the dominant male (Pellis
and Pellis, 2009). Nevertheless, the delayed, lasting functions of play are still considered very important.
It seems that what animals mainly learn and train for in play are not so much physical fitness/endurance
(which fades away quickly; Byers and Walker, 1995), or specific skills such as prey catching in cats (Caro,
1980) or fighting proficiency in meerkats (Suricata suricatta) (Sharpe, 2005), as these seem to mature to
full function even if play is prevented or reduced, but rather various kinds of general physical and/or
psychological flexibility. This is underscored by the facts that the neurobiology of play is distinct from that
of ‘serious’ adult types of behaviour such as social, sexual or aggressive behaviour (Vanderschuren et al.,
1997) and that play repertoires include many elements totally dissimilar to ‘serious’ behaviours (Petrů et
al., 2009).
Play has several features that channel it towards creating novelty: play elements are incomplete,
exaggerated or awkward compared with elements used in ‘serious’ contexts; play elements follow each
other in variable sequences; and many play elements have a self-handicapping character, that is, they
put the playing animal into unnecessary disadvantageous positions and situations where the animal loses
control over its movements (Petrů et al., 2009). For instance, vigorous and variable head rotations, torso
twists and body pirouettes are among the most widely occurring elements of play (Byers, 1984). Petrů et
al. (2008) analysed the kinematics of play head rotations in Hanuman langurs (Presbytis entellus) and
found that they include different, sometimes extreme positions of the head that follow each other in
variable sequences; vision is most probably blurred during such rotations owing to the high angular
velocities. Špinka et al. (2001) specifically suggested that one major and widely present function of play is
to train for unexpected situations and mishaps, i.e. to practice in a ‘relaxed field’ how to handle,
behaviourally and emotionally, situations where external forces kick the animal out of control and routine.
In their book on rat play fighting, Pellis and Pellis (2009) conclude that juvenile play fighting enhances the
experience of unpredictability and thus provides a perfect means by which to fine-tune emotional
reactivity, and so to produce an animal that is capable of subtle and nuanced responses to novel and
potentially dangerous situations. According to Pellis and Pellis, deprivation of play fighting during rat
ontogeny does not take away specific social or cognitive skills but, rather, impairs the ability of the

animals to calibrate their emotional response; hence, play-deprived animals are unable to apply their
motor, social, or cognitive skills effectively in challenging situations.
These examples from different fields of behavioural research indicate and support that animals possess a
general skill to initiate, and persist in, interaction with their environment in a way that appears directly
beneficial to a range of specific skills and their ability to cope with adverse, restrictive conditions.
4. Agency Responds to Appropriate Challenge
The examples of agency/competence in the preceding sections illustrate that an animal may be
intrinsically motivated to engage with the environment, but still requires certain conditions to be met
before it will do so. Not all types and levels of challenge elicit exploration or play equally – it seems that a
moderate degree of challenge is most likely to evoke a positive interactive response. To capture this,
Hebb (1955) proposed a model in which he linked the occurrence of explorative behaviour to optimal
levels of arousal, postulating that too little novelty would fail to arouse the animal’s attention, whereas too
much would startle or frighten it into a fear or stress response. This idea was further developed by Inglis
(1983), who suggested that an animal prefers the greatest degree of discrepant input to occur when it is
best able to assimilate that input. Watters (2009) takes this notion further in a zoo context, arguing that
apparently paradoxically, zoo animals are most motivated to interact with types of enrichment that
produce a pay-off that is uncertain, i.e. that is neither guaranteed nor highly improbable. For example,
play behaviour tends to be stimulated by environments that are slippery or otherwise tricky to such a
degree that full control over the animal’s own movements becomes difficult, yet the risk of injury or
serious mishap is small, such as is the case for shallow water, fresh snow, sloped terrains, thin flexible
branches or swinging suspensions (Byers, 1977; Heinrich and Smolker 1998; Petrů et al., 2009).

Fig. 1. Schematic depiction of the relationship between the strength of a challenge and the strength of an
animal’s skill.

Not only is agency best stimulated by intermediate levels of challenge, it also affects the animal’s
competence most positively at such levels. This notion is akin to the idea of ‘eustress’: the idea that
moderately challenging environments can evoke a stress response in the animal which in the longer term
has a positive effect on its survival and welfare (Langbein et al., 2004; Moncek et al., 2004). Summarizing

such information, Meehan and Mench (2007, p. 248) propose the notion of ‘appropriate challenge’,
defined as ‘problems that may elicit frustration, but are potentially solvable or escapable through the
application of cognitive and behavioural skills’. Fig. 1 illustrates this notion. If challenges are too strong for
the skills of the animal, fear will freeze agency; if challenges are not up to the skills, boredom will result.
An appropriate level of challenge stimulates agency and this engagement, in turn, enhances competence.
The type and relative level of challenge may also influence the type of agency in which the animal will
engage. For instance, relatively high levels of uncertainty or novelty may incite exploration, but as the
confidence of the animal with the situation grows, exploration may give way to play (Špinka et al., 2001).
5. The Importance of Agency/Competence for Welfare
Agency and competence are clearly important for the survival and reproductive success of wild animals.
But do these abilities also play an important role for the welfare of captive animals whose survival and
concomitant needs are mostly met by the captive environment? In the following paragraphs, we argue
that there might be a threefold positive relevance of agency/competence for animal welfare. In Fig. 2a
(and also in Fig. 2b, as discussed in Section 6), we illustrate our argument with the simplifying
assumption that feelings (i.e. sentient experiences) are at the core of animal welfare (Duncan, 1996),
although more complex approaches that also include health (Dawkins, 2008), naturalness (Appleby,
1999; Fraser and Weary, 2005) and indeed the wholeness of the animal (Wemelsfelder, 2007; see also
Section 3.8) may be more appropriate.
First, there is growing evidence that expressions of agency are rewarding for animals independently of
any functional outcome that they may have. We know, as argued above, that animals will engage in
solving problems without any apparent form of external reward, and this suggests they may enjoy the
process of learning itself (Harlow, 1950). For example, pigs, cattle, chickens and other species engage in
what is known as ‘contra-freeloading’; that is, they will make an effort to work for a reward even if the
reward is also available freely (Inglis et al., 1997; de Jonge et al., 2008; Hessle et al., 2008; Lindqvist and
Jensen, 2008). Combining a cognitive task with a food reward in an otherwise barren environment can
lead to overeating in rats and goats; this also supports the rewarding value of such tasks over and above
obtaining food (Johnson et al., 2004; Langbein et al., 2009). Physiological evidence in support of such
value comes from a study by Kalbe and Puppe (2010), who found that long-term cognitive enrichment for
pigs in the form of an operant feeding system significantly affects gene expression of reward-sensitive
cerebral receptors in the amygdalae of the animals concerned.
In addition, a number of studies indicate more directly that the process of problem solving affects an
animal’s mood. Hagen and Broom (2004) set five heifers (the experimental animals) the task of learning
how to open a gate to gain access to a food reward, and matched these animals with five control heifers
for whom the gate opened automatically the moment that the experimental animals had succeeded in
opening the gate. Detailed comparison of fluctuations in the heart-rate and behavioural vigour of the two
animal groups led the authors to suggest that progression of the problem-solving process in experimental
animals was associated with raised arousal and agitation, and that this may in turn reflect an awareness
by the animal of its progress in learning – in other words, an understanding of, and excitement about,
‘getting there’. Whether this was mainly a positive or negative excitement (i.e. frustration or enjoyment)
cannot be told from these quantitative data. A qualitative assessment approach addressing an animal’s
‘body language’, such as developed by Wemelsfelder et al. (2001, 2009), may shed further light on the
actual experience of such experimental animals. Langbein et al. (2004), in a study of instrumental
learning in dwarf goats, also looked in detail at correlations between the learning process, learning
success and physiological indicators such as heart rate and heart rate variability. Like Hagen and Broom
(2004), they suggest that the observed response patterns reflect a process of understanding of, and
gaining control over, the task – a process they interpret in terms of ‘positive stress’. Yet this term still

reflects an abstract scientific understanding; what precisely this means for the actual experience of the
animals requires more direct qualitative investigation of their behavioural expression (Wemelsfelder,
2007).
Expressions of agency other than problem solving appear to be similarly self-rewarding. Play routinely
tends to be considered as self-rewarding because it does not result in any obvious goal, and often
emanates a sense of relaxed and intensive in-the-moment enjoyment (Fagen, 1992). Common ravens,
for example, will fly upside down, slide down snowy slopes on their backs, play tug of war, or play ‘pass
the stick’ in mid-air (Heinrich and Smolker 1998); Siberian ibex kids may jump into the air from overhangs
and perform two or three neck twists and heel kicks before landing (Byers, 1977); and domestic piglets
can stimulate each other into a playing frenzy in which the whole litter sprints around barking excitedly
(Špinka, personal observation). Such behavioural examples are complemented by evidence that the
performance of play instigates an increase in brain opioid levels (Vanderschuren et al., 1995).

Fig. 2. Welfare effects of agency (a) expressed and (b) suppressed.

Exploration, too, is positively valued by animals, even when the acquired information has no immediate
use for feeding, sexual behaviour or other actions leading to consummatory rewards. Wood-Gush and
Vestergaard (1991) demonstrated that piglets select an arena containing a novel object rather than one

containing a familiar object, even though neither object was of any utility. Moreover, the piglets displayed
an increase of locomotor play near the novel objects, indicating their positive experience from the
exploration. Newberry (1999) showed that domestic chickens value the possibility of exploring novel
objects of zero utility as much as the exploitation of non-essential resources such as peat moss or straw
bale.
The second way in which agency may benefit welfare stems from the self-building nature of
agency/competence. The idea is that because animals benefit from being as competent as possible, and
because exercising agency engenders competence, animals will get ‘drawn into’ agency-based activity
through positive competence–reinforcement loops. Inglis et al. (2001) and Inglis and Langton (2006)
showed that mathematical modelling of behaviour based on such starting points could indeed simulate
empirically observed behaviour in, for example, studies of contra-freeloading and latent learning.
Csikszentmihalyi (1992) is an author well known for his studies of the interaction between competence
and happiness in humans, which resulted in what he calls a ‘theory of flow’. This theory posits that a
person’s experienced happiness is a function of the interaction between perceived challenge and skill
levels. If the level of challenge is perceived to be higher than the level of skill, a person will try to learn
new skills, while if perceived skills are greater than the challenge, he/she will seek more challenge. Thus,
perceived challenge and skill chase each other, which, Csikszentmihalyi argues, leads to ‘reorganization
and growth in the order and complexity of consciousness’ (Moneta and Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 277), a
process subjectively experienced as ‘flow’. The greatest experience of ‘flow’, and the greatest associated
happiness, arise when both perceived challenges and skills are high and the person is intensely engaged
with what he or she is doing through focused attention and sustained concentration and activity. So for
animals as well, opportunities to initiate and maintain meaningful cycles of behavioural and cognitive
effort are likely to produce a similar feeling of ‘flow’, and thereby contribute significantly to their longer
term welfare.
The third welfare effect of agency arises from the influence that increased competence potentially has on
an animal’s physical health and fitness, and thereby on positive feelings such as contentment. In the first
place, increased levels of interaction and mobility may have direct physical benefits, such as stronger
bones, stronger muscles, a stronger heart and higher physical endurance (Spangenberg et al, 2005,
2009; Schenck et al., 2008), while improved sensorimotor coordination has been shown to lead to greater
neural complexity and plasticity which, in turn, may enhance physical fitness and rehabilitation (Kleim and
Jones, 2008). More generally though, through the skills and information that they acquire, active animals
are likely to be more confident and perform better in fulfilling their daily needs – ending up better fed,
better protected and socially better positioned than animals that are highly restrained. Evidence is
growing that such general improvement of an animal’s ability to cope can affect its health and fitness
even in captive environments; for example, rats exposed to spatially demanding tasks are subject to
lower mortality rates (Bell et al., 2009), while pigs taught to discriminate between sounds to obtain food
showed faster wound healing and better overall immunity than pigs not exposed to these challenges
(Ernst et al., 2006). So allowing an animal to exercise agency not only affects its immediate welfare, but is
also likely to improve its longer term physical health and fitness.
6. The Consequences of Suppressed Agency/Competence in Restrictive Environments
What happens when animals adapted to deal with the vagaries of natural environments are born and
raised in simple, restrictive captive environments? Does this affect their expression of
agency/competence, and concomitantly, the richness of their behaviour and experience? Also, most
importantly in the context of this book: what are the consequences of such behavioural and cognitive
changes for their welfare?

Agency is intrinsic to the way animals behave, and animals will therefore engage with their environment
even if it is unchallenging, restrictive and unresponsive. However, such environments will limit the
frequency and diversity with which agency is expressed. For instance, enclosures are often much too
small to allow animals to go out and look for novelty, and prevent the expression of inquisitive exploration;
at best, an opportunity for inspective exploration may occasionally arrive. Equally, if social partners are
few, of the wrong category, or absent altogether, an animal will not be able to engage in social play (Pellis
and Pellis, 2009) With the animal’s agency suppressed this way, its development of competence will soon
hit a limit too (Fig. 3.3), and the animal’s scope for interaction will remain limited and stagnant (Von Frijtag
et al., 2002).

Fig. 3. Effects of suppressed agency on animals living in barren environments.

There is considerable evidence indicating that animals housed in restrictive environments show reduced
behavioural diversity both in their home pens (Gunn and Morton, 1995; Haskell et al., 1996) and in
response to novel objects (Beattie et al., 2000; Wemelsfelder et al., 2000; Meehan and Mench, 2002),
and use a large proportion of their time lying down, sleeping or dozing (Gunn and Morton, 1995, Zanella
et al., 1996). They may also spend extended periods of time in motionless sitting or standing, often with
drooping heads and ears, half-closed eyes, abnormally bent limbs, or pressed against a wall or stall
division. Such passive postures have been characterized qualitatively as apathetic, helpless or depressed
(Wood-Gush and Vestergaard, 1991; Martin, 2002). In addition, certain behaviour patterns appear to
become less versatile, and more fixed and compulsive in their execution; stereotyped pacing in captive
polar bears, for example, has been linked to the frustration of their freedom to patrol (Clubb and Mason,
2004), while food-related stereotypies in intensively farmed animals are linked to, among other factors,
the prevention of foraging (Mason and Mendl, 1997). Stereotyped animals may also show an overly
aggressive and/or fearful reaction to novel or unexpected events (Broom, 1986).
Thus, captive animals may be physically mobile and respond to perceived stimuli, but the question is
whether such activity is reflective of normal agency. Do the animals interact resourcefully and playfully
with their environment, are they busy and absorbed in organizing their lives? The passive, unvaried and
sometimes rigid nature of behavior patterns that are, as discussed in the paragraph above, observed in
captive animals, suggests this may not be the case. Wemelsfelder (2005) proposes that such
characteristics, in their multifaceted complexity, reflect a chronic disruption of ‘flow’ in the organization of

an animal’s behaviour (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1992, see section 3.5), and with that a potential suppression,
or even dismantling, of its agency (Fig. 3). Animals are prevented from sustaining activities that they are
motivated to perform, and so their engagement with the environment deteriorates, and the versatility and
flow of their behaviour dries up.
What are the welfare consequences of such deterioration? First, the suppression of agency will directly
affect an animal’s emotional state in various ways. For a start, inability to express agency will deprive
animals of experiencing the positive feelings that accompany agency (Fig. 2a,b). In recent years, there
has been increasing emphasis on the importance of the positive aspects of welfare for an animal’s wellbeing, related for example to social interaction or exploration and play (Boissy et al., 2007; Napolitano et
al., 2009). Welfare is no longer viewed solely in terms of functional health and the absence of suffering,
but also in terms of positive experiences or, generally, good ‘quality of life’ (McMillan, 2005). In Section 5
the expression of agency was described as being associated with the positive interest and excitement of
exploration and problem solving, the relaxation and enjoyment of play, and the contentment and
happiness of experiencing sustained competence and ‘flow’. Depriving animals of opportunities for
agency would therefore deny them a source of naturally sustained positive experience. Clearly, more
research is needed to investigate whether, and under what circumstances, animals experience states of
pleasure, enjoyment or contentment.
In addition, various authors have suggested that the suppression of agency is also associated with an
experience of boredom and, in the longer run, perhaps also with states of depression and/or
helplessness. Glanzer (1958) argued that suboptimal levels of information processing induce boredom,
but adds that animals growing up in impoverished environments may adjust to such conditions and not
acutely suffer. Inglis (1983) postulates as well that animals may get used to discrepancies between
expected and actual levels of novelty, and although initially bored, may eventually settle down. So one
could argue that passivity in captive animals could be seen as an adaptive strategy or life history avenue
designed for highly predictable environments. However, the question is to what extent such assertions
correspond with actual observed behavioural processes in captive animals. Wemelsfelder (2005), as
discussed above, argues that a multifaceted range of behavioural symptoms in captive animals reflects
chronic disruption of behavioural ‘flow’, and that, as such, this should not be regarded as a form of
functional adaptation. Rather, in analogy with human behavioural organization, such symptoms may be
considered indicative of chronic boredom and depression, or general psychological atrophy (cf.
Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Harris, 2000). Early discussion of this condition in animals was provided by
McFarland (1989), who characterized states of chronic behavioural deprivation and indecision as ‘limbo’.
In the more recent experimental literature, the term boredom is frequently used to interpret the observed
effects of impoverished environments on animal welfare (e.g. Newberry, 1999; Ernst et al., 2005;
Manteuffel et al., 2009). Therefore, if we can accept that through active engagement with their
environment animals experience meaning and enjoyment in what they do, then there seems to be no
reason why chronic disruption of such engagement should not be experienced as debilitating, boring, or
even depressingly dull.
A second way in which declining agency may affect welfare is through the consequences of
underdeveloped competence, such as heightened fear and anxiety and compromised social coping. Not
exercising competence may lead animals to regress in their ability to develop appropriate expectancies
and act upon these; they become less well able to classify and evaluate perceived environmental stimuli,
and will be less ready to deal with challenges once they arise. As a consequence, unexpected or novel
events will startle and arouse animals more, and they will fail to exploit the novel information available.
Laboratory animals, for example, may adjust poorly to experimental procedures which involve transport
and handling (e.g. Rennie and Buchanan-Smith, 2006), while for farm animals, arrival at a

slaughterhouse, with its crowded, noisy, unfamiliar conditions, may be particularly stressful (Deiss et al.,
2009). Rats and pigs deprived of natural amounts of play during early periods of ontogeny have
compromised ability to solve social conflicts and therefore experience more prolonged and/or more
intense fights (Pellis and Pellis, 2009; Newberry et al., 2000). Thus, rather than living in quiescent
adjustment to their barren surroundings, animals from impoverished backgrounds may be overwhelmed
by events when they arise, fail to cope and experience intense fear or anxiety (Von Frijtag et al., 2002;
Chaloupková et al., 2007).
A third potential implication of declining agency for welfare lies in health-related effects. As described at
the end of Section 3.5, animals living permanently in impoverished surroundings may heal from injuries
less well (Ernst et al., 2006), and are therefore likely to experience more pain. Farm animals living in more
restrictive systems generally suffer from a higher incidence of painful production-related diseases, such
as mastitis and lameness in dairy cows (Laven et al., 2008a,b), or leg problems in pigs (Kilbride et al.,
2009a,b).To what extent these deleterious health effects are indeed a result of the effects of
impoverished agency remains to be established.
7. Is the Expression of Agency/Competence the Same in All Animals?
The ability of animals to act competently in a challenging environment does not imply that animals always
tackle challenges in innovative or complicated ways. In everyday tasks, animals use well-proven
strategies, long-adopted behavioural routines, simple rules of thumb and direct cues from the
environment whenever possible (e.g. McLinn and Stephens, 2006). For instance, after dwelling in a
locality for some time, the process of motor learning trains the animal to move quickly and efficiently
through the environment, with little further cognitive processing (Stamps, 1995). Also, animal species,
populations and individuals often specialize on a limited diet, even though other types of food in the
environment are available and potentially equally rewarding (Tosh et al., 2009). So many everyday tasks
are performed in a skilled, routine way, and yet the mastery of routine is complemented by the astuteness
and flexibility of competence (when challenges arise) and by the self-driven dynamism of agency.
Notwithstanding the fundamental value of agency, its expression can differ to considerable extent
between species, age groups, gender categories and individuals. In other words, the quantitative balance
between application of routines and the utilization of competence- and agency-related behaviours varies
across species, animals and situations. For instance, among non-human primate species, the proportion
of time devoted to social play ranges between 1 and 22% (Lewis and Barton, 2006), a variation that
correlates closely with differences in relative volume of the amygdala and hypothalamus, two brain
regions involved in the organization of social and emotional responsiveness. In polygynous and
promiscuous mammal species, males engage more frequently in social play than females, whereas in
monogamous species there is no difference between the sexes (Chau et al., 2008). Even in closely
related species, the amount and complexity of play can differ considerably, such as between the Norway
rat and domestic mice (Pellis and Pellis, 2009), or between kaka and kea parrots (Diamond and Bold,
2004). Such variations can be due to the different demands of species niches. For instance, migratory
garden warblers explore more over a wide area, perhaps because they need to find food quickly during
short stays on stopover sites, while the related resident Sardinian warblers are much less keen to explore
widely (Mettke-Hofmann and Gwinner, 2004). However the amount of everyday expressions of agency is
not in any obvious way related to the apparent intelligence of a species. For instance, wild-living orangutans are renowned for their tendency to spend several days on one tree with abundant fruits just sitting,
eating and sleeping (Lhota, personal communication), while some reptiles, such as monitor lizards, may
be agile learners when it comes to novel ways for acquiring food (Manrod et al., 2008).

Ontogenetic variation in agency can also be prominent. During the later phases of ontogeny, expressions
of agency should theoretically decrease because the shortening remainder of lifespan diminishes the
value of future competence in relation to the current costs of agency. Indeed, declining levels of
exploratory behaviour after the prepubertal peak have been documented in rats and mice (Arakawa,
2007). Some facets of agency are mostly expressed during a well-defined period of ontogeny. For
instance, play has a typical inverted U-shaped ontogenetic occurrence with the highest levels during the
juvenile period in mice, rats, cats and pigs (Byers and Walker, 1995; Blackshaw et al., 1997)
Furthermore, the expression of agency varies considerably within age and gender categories of the same
species. It has long been recognized that individual animals respond to challenges in different ways, and
this fact has been the focus of intensive study over the past two decades, often under headings such as
‘individual difference’, ‘coping style’, or ‘temperament’ (Croft et al., 2009; Jones and Godin, 2010),
although where such studies include the tendency of animals to explore, play and be sociable,
researchers are more likely to speak of ‘personality dimensions’ (Svartberg et al., 2005; Smith and
Blumstein, 2008). From such differences, it follows that restrictive environments and their inhibiting effect
on agency may affect some individuals more than others, and will certainly affect different individuals in
different ways. Research with captive orang-utans for example, has indicated that animals scoring highly
on ‘extraversion’ and ‘agreeableness’ personality factors and low on ‘neuroticism’ factors also score
highly on a subjective well-being questionnaire (Weiss et al., 2006).
Finally, even within one individual animal, the propensity to explore, play or patrol may vary with different
locations, seasons, times of day or even moods. Theoretically, an animal should engage in such
behaviours if and when this is likely to provide benefits that are greater than the costs, relative to the
other things that it could be doing (Dall et al., 2005). In times of nutritional hardship, many mammalian
species will dramatically reduce their engagement in play, focusing instead on essential foraging and
maintenance behaviours (Baldwin and Baldwin, 1976; Muller-Schwarze et al., 1982; Stone, 2008). It has
been suggested that, in this light, play may be considered a ‘luxury behaviour’ (Lawrence, 1987). While
there may be clear prioritization of life-sustaining and reproductive behaviours over play, and possibly
over other types of agency in many instances, agency-type behaviours are often reinstated at an early
occasion, indicating that they do have long-term fitness benefits. Moreover, agency-type behaviours,
including play, may actually increase during tense times, such as pre-feeding periods or crowded indoor
housing (Palagi et al., 2006; Tacconi and Palagi, 2009), because they enhance competence through, for
instance, relieving tension or signalling friendly intentions. The term ‘luxury behaviour’ is also misleading
from a welfare point of view because it disregards how systematically important agency-type behaviours
are for the positive side of animal welfare.
As we argue throughout this chapter, the continuous opportunity to engage in agency and thus to
enhance competence is fundamental for the welfare of any animal. However, the variability in quantity
and quality of agency expression that we have just discussed indicates that how specifically welfare will
be compromised as a result of the suppression of agency in captive environments depends very much on
the species and category of animals.
8. The Integrated Nature of Agency and Competence – What Does It Mean?
We have discussed different expressions, functions and benefits of agency and competence. However, iit
is important to note that in the end agency is an integrative capacity that works across specific modules of
organization. The neuroscience literature also agrees that there are common neuromotivational pathways
connecting specific modules and integrating emerging information into anticipatory, flexible, rewardsensitive patterns of behavior (Van der Harst and Spruijt 2007). Yet, in the neuroscience literature that
discusses such integrative systems, one seldom finds references to agency and/or competence.

‘Integration’ is not necessarily conceived as something actively done by the animal, but rather as
something that happens in the animal, a systemic feature of behavioural organization which can at best
be regarded as possibly a ‘higher-order’ neural state (e.g. Sterelny, 2001). This may perhaps seem a
small semantic disparity, but philosophically it lies at the heart of what it means to talk about agency. In
the final section of this chapter we will, therefore, briefly touch on the philosophical debate surrounding
this concept.
Philosophical discussions of agency tend to centre around the question to what extent, if at all, humans
and animals can be considered ‘do-ers’, that is, ‘authors’ of their own conduct (Hyman and Steward,
2004; McFarland and Hediger, 2009). Traditionally, in this context, agency is seen as yet another signifier
of the human–animal divide: humans behave intentionally, with insight and foresight, and hence can be
held responsible for their conduct, whereas animals behave instinctively, blindly and cannot. In recent
times, however, this ground has begun to shift. Animal intentionality, the question of whether or not
animals act ‘knowingly’, is the subject of a rapidly growing field of research covering an ever-widening
range of species (e.g. Hurley and Nudds, 2006). In this field, a wide range of evidence supporting the
cognitive mediation of animal behaviour has emerged, such as, for example, evidence for foresight in pigs
(Špinka et al., 1998); yet scientific opinion on the extent to which such mediation reflects ‘true
understanding’ remains deeply divided. There is much talk about ‘lower-order’ and ‘higher-order’ levels of
intentionality, with recent studies proposing that it is not basic cognition, but ‘metacognition’, an ability
apparently shown by few animal species, that reflects true intentionality (Smith, 2009). At present, it
remains extremely difficult to find criteria of any kind that unambiguously distinguish ‘true’ from
‘apparently’ intentional behaviour, and discussions of what such a distinction might imply continue with
unabated vigour.
But there is also a second way in which traditional views of agency are shifting. In this, the notion of
agency is used to emphasize the integrity of the whole animal, and to discuss critically mechanistic/
informational models that typically separate (‘lower’) bodily behaviour and (‘higher’) mental processing of
information into different conceptual realms. Cognitive approaches have, for example, been criticized for
over-intellectualizing agency, making application to animals less likely (e.g. Hurley, 2006; Steward, 2009).
A more holistic approach would regard animals generally as integrated sentient beings and, in this
context, the notion of agency would not primarily refer to the direction of action by thought, but to the
centrality of the whole animal in directing action (Hornsby 2004; Hurley, 2006). Such a notion does not
encounter the need to distinguish between ‘blind’ and ‘knowing’ behaviour, because it regards all
behaviour as sentient, and all animal sentience as embodied, and thus views sentience and intelligence
as fundamental and gradually evolving properties of behavioural organization. Whether or not this is a
reasonable, scientifically acceptable proposition is a question that goes to the heart of what it means to
do science; clearly, there is not the space here to discuss that question at any length. One advantage of
this approach for animal welfare, however, is that an animal’s experience is conceived as an integrative
aspect of its behavioural expression, and hence becomes more directly observable, and more amenable
to description and interpretation, than it would have been if it were purely regarded as an ‘internal mental
state’ (Wemelsfelder, 1997, 2007).
The material discussed in this chapter is not meant to support any of these approaches in particular – we
have drawn equally on physiological, health-related, behavioural and cognitive studies wherever these
were relevant to the theme of the chapter. That theme was to discuss and provide scientific support for
the propensity and ability of animals to engage proactively with their environment, and to learn to deal
skilfully and flexibly with novel and existing challenges. We think this ability is real, and that in addition to
more specific abilities, plays a vital role in ensuring an animal’s health and quality of life. Taking agency
seriously as a topic for ethology and for animal welfare science and practice is bound to lead to more

incisive observation of how animals behave, and therefore to inform the philosophical debate in
scientifically relevant ways.
9. Conclusions
•

•

•

•

•

Natural environments expose animals to many varied and novel challenges. We argue that
animals possess an integrated yet multifaceted ability, which we call competence, to deal with
such challenges.
Competence is reinforced by an animal’s agency, i.e. its intrinsic propensity to engage with the
environment beyond the degree dictated by momentary needs, with the main purpose of
gathering knowledge and enhancing the animal’s skills for future use.
As agency/competence concerns the integration of different levels of organization, it provides
animal welfare scientists with an opportunity to address the wholeness of animals, an aspect of
welfare that tends to be overshadowed by the focus on specific modules of animal welfare.
The agency/competence complex is relevant for animal welfare for at least three reasons. First,
performance of agency is directly rewarding for the animal. Secondly, when allowed its full
course, agency makes the animal competent to meet high challenges with high skills, a state that
has been described as fulfilling in humans, and that presumably would also be in other animals.
Thirdly, highly competent animals deal with challenges more efficiently and successfully than less
competent ones, and thus end up healthier and less fearful.
It is, therefore, likely that when captive environments deny animals the opportunity to unfold their
agency, they prevent those animals from achieving better welfare in all three aspects: immediate
reward value, long-term build-up of positive psychological constitution and the ability to maintain
health and psychological balance in the face of challenges.
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